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THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AND
THE DESIGN PROFESSIONAL’S
LIABILITY IN TEXAS
By: Shelby Russell*
ABSTRACT
The economic loss rule bars recovery by a party who suffers only economic
loss, unaccompanied by harm to the person or property. Although the eco-
nomic loss rule was developed as a way to maintain a “boundary line” be-
tween contract and tort law, the application of the rule has proven difficult
because of its potential for broad applicability and inequitable results. Because
of this, several jurisdictions across the United States have adopted exceptions
to the general economic loss rule. One such exception is negligent misrepre-
sentation. The negligent misrepresentation exception is outlined in section 552
of the Second Restatement of Torts. The exception provides that a person who
conveys negligent information in the course of his or her business for the gui-
dance of persons within a limited class, who then rely on that information to
their detriment, are liable to those persons in tort notwithstanding the eco-
nomic loss rule. Until recently, Texas law was unclear as to whether it had
adopted negligent misrepresentation as a general exception to the economic
loss rule. It is clear, however, that Texas has adopted an exception to the eco-
nomic loss rule for professionals who provide negligent information in the
course of their profession. The Court in LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co. (“LAN/STV”) chose not to extend this exception to design professionals
who provide negligent design plans to contractors for a construction project.
This decision has received backlash by many in the construction industry as it
produces inequitable results and does not extend the “professional” exception
to design professionals. Texas should adopt the negligent misrepresentation
exception to the economic loss rule, as applied to design professionals in the
construction context, so that tort remedies are available to contractors who
suffer economic losses due to their reliance on negligent plans from a design
professional.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The construction business depends on specialized information, and
the fundamental role of a design professional on a construction pro-
ject is to provide information for the guidance of the contractor. What
happens when the design professional provides the contractor with
faulty information, or information so poor and full of gaps that it
might as well be false? The Texas Supreme Court answered this ques-
tion through the LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.1 decision—
contractors who suffer pecuniary loss due to their reliance on a design
professional’s negligently misrepresented design plans are barred by
the economic loss rule from recovering against the design professional
in tort.2
The economic loss rule developed as a way to maintain a boundary
between contract and tort law,3 but the application of the rule has
1. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2014).
2. See id. at 249–50.
3. Id. at 240 (citing Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Eco-
nomic Loss Rule, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 523, 554 (2009)).
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proven difficult. Stated simply, “the ‘economic-loss rule’ bars recovery
in tort when a party suffers economic loss unaccompanied by harm to
his own person or property.”4 The economic loss rule has broad appli-
cability and is often accompanied by a wide range of exceptions to
resolve potential inequitable results, including an exception for negli-
gent misrepresentation.5 Prior to the LAN/STV decision, Texas case
law was unclear as to whether the negligent misrepresentation excep-
tion had been adopted. However, following the LAN/STV decision it
appears that the Texas Supreme Court has rejected a general negli-
gent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule, and spe-
cifically rejected the exception in the construction context.6 This Note
proposes that Texas adopt the negligent misrepresentation exception
to the economic loss rule in the construction context where a design
professional provides negligent information to the contractor on a
project, resulting in economic losses.
Part II of this Note sets forth the background of the economic loss
rule, the two major rationales for its application, and its potential for
inequitable results. Although the economic loss rule provides an im-
portant boundary between contract and tort law and protects
tortfeasors from boundless liability,7 it also has the potential to pro-
duce inequitable results.8 Part II of this Note discusses the adoption of
the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule as
a means to prevent these inequitable results.
Part III of this Note discusses Texas case law concerning the status
of the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss
rule. Prior to the LAN/STV decision, Texas case law was murky as to
whether the misrepresentation exception had been adopted.9 Several
Texas courts have adopted the exception in regard to professionals,
while other Texas courts have not.10
Part IV of this Note examines the facts and holding of the Texas
Supreme Court in LAN/STV and evaluates whether the economic loss
rule prevents a general contractor from recovering pecuniary damages
caused by the design professional’s negligent misrepresentation of the
project’s plans and specifications. The Court rejected the negligent
4. Wiltz v. Bayer CropScience, LP, 645 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2011).
5. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir.
1985).
6. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 247 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 6, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014)).
7. Jim Wren, Applying the Economic Loss Rule in Texas, 64 BAYLOR L. REV.
204, 214 (2012).
8. See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 57.
9. See infra Part II.
10. Charles E. Fowler, Jr., The Economic Loss Rule and Its Application to the Tort
of Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 893, 904 (2012);
Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 920 (Tex. 2010)
(noting the negligent misrepresentation exception in causes of action “legitimately
brought against auditors, accountants, and other professionals”).
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misrepresentation exception as applied to design professionals, hold-
ing that the contractor’s sole remedy should be found in contract
rather than tort.11
In Parts V and VI of this Note, the potential inequities and negative
implications imposed by the LAN/STV decision are countered by a
proposal for Texas to adopt the negligent misrepresentation exception
to the application of the economic loss rule. Part V explores case law
and rationale from jurisdictions that have adopted the negligent mis-
representation exception where professionals or “special relation-
ships” are involved.12 Part VI provides public policy and practical
considerations that support the adoption of the negligent misrepresen-
tation exception. Although several inequities would result from the
broad application of the economic loss rule, this Note discusses the
potential implications of discouraging responsibility in the production
of design plans by design professionals,13 prejudicing unsophisticated
parties,14 and overlooking the large class of public works projects
where contractual bargaining is impossible.15
II. ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The economic loss rule is defined as a bar on recovery in a tort
action when a “party suffers economic loss unaccompanied by harm to
his own person or property.”16 However, there is no universal eco-
nomic loss rule, and Texas courts have often struggled with its applica-
bility, specifically in the context of negligent misrepresentation.17
Although several courts have oversimplified the economic loss rule by
stating that it bars recovery of pure economic losses by parties who
are not in contractual privity, this interpretation is not completely ac-
curate.18 The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that a reference to a
single economic loss rule is a “misnomer” because “there is not one
economic loss rule broadly applicable throughout the field of torts.”19
Rather, in various areas of the law, there are several variations of the
economic loss rule that are governed by limited rules.20 The applica-
11. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 249–50.
12. See infra Part V; see also Mark M. Schneier, Annotation, Tort Liability of Pro-
ject Architect or Engineer for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor or Subcon-
tractor, 61 A.L.R.6th 445 § 2 (2011).
13. See infra Section VI.A; see also ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 85–86 (2014).
14. See infra Section VI.B; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
15. See infra Section VI.C. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 252.043 (West
Supp. 2014) (detailing the procedure for awarding government contracts).
16. Wiltz v. Bayer CropScience, LP, 645 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2011).
17. Wren, supra note 7, at 207 (citing Johnson, supra note 3, at 534–35).
18. See id. at 212–13.
19. Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex.
2011) (quoting Johnson, supra note 3, at 534–35).
20. Id.
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tion of the economic loss rule in relation to the tort of negligent mis-
representation is an example of a situation governed by one of these
limited rules.21
The Second Restatement of Torts section 552 (“section 552”), la-
beled “Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others,”
provides a tort remedy for individuals that lose money due to an-
other’s negligent misrepresentation within the context of a business
transaction.22 Section 552 provides for the liability of professionals
who fail to exercise reasonable care in communicating information to
a third party knowing that the third party will rely on the informa-
tion.23 Under section 552, the third party has a claim for negligent
misrepresentation regardless of whether the individual is in contrac-
tual privity with the person who provided the information.24 For ex-
ample, comment g of section 552 provides that a third party will have
a claim for negligent misrepresentation even if the defendant does not
directly communicate the faulty information to him or her.25 Com-
ment g further provides that it is unnecessary that the defendant actu-
ally know the identity of the third party to whom the information is
provided, so long as the defendant intends that the information will
influence and be relied upon by a discrete class of persons, separate
from the larger class of persons that will eventually be reasonably ex-
pected to have access to the information.26
Section 552B of the Second Restatement of Torts, labeled “Dam-
ages for Negligent Misrepresentation,” provides the damages that are
21. See id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). This section
states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-
ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose ben-
efit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect
them.
Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. A defendant is liable to a limited class of potential plaintiffs that justifi-
ably relies on the false information communicated by the defendant. Id.
25. Id. at cmt. g.
26. See id.
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recoverable for a claim of negligent misrepresentation.27 Damages
available under section 552B include “pecuniary loss suffered . . . as a
consequence of the plaintiff’s reliance upon the misrepresentation,”
but exclude damages recoverable through the benefit of a contract
with the defendant.28 It is important to note that a claim for negligent
misrepresentation is an independent injury for pecuniary damages
that are above, beyond, and apart from any damages available
through contract law.29 Therefore, if a plaintiff can prove an action for
negligent misrepresentation, he or she is entitled to “economic out-of-
pocket losses,” regardless of whether he or she is in contractual privity
with the defendant.30 However, the plaintiff cannot receive “benefit-
of-the-bargain damages” that arise from the subject matter of a con-
tract, as these are separate remedies recoverable in contract rather
than in tort.31
There are two major rationales for the application of the economic
loss rule: (1) to protect the boundary between tort and contract law;
and (2) to protect tortfeasors whose actions are not related to contract
from boundless liability.32
A. Protection of the Boundary Line Between Tort
and Contract Law
The first and most common rationale for the application of the eco-
nomic loss rule is to protect the boundary between contract and tort
law, providing deference to bargained-for contracts.33 This rationale is
based on the theory that when parties are in contractual privity with
each other, the contract—not the law of torts—should control damage
awards because the parties have had the opportunity to bargain and
allocate the risks of economic harm.34 Allowing tort law to control in
situations involving pure economic losses, rather than the contract the
parties agreed on, has the potential to undermine the role of contract
law.35 As one commentator poignantly has noted, “Quite simply, the
27. Id. § 552B.
28. Id. Pecuniary damages are available only for those damages that are not recov-
erable under a contract. See id.
29. CCE, Inc. v. PBS & J Constr. Servs., Inc., 461 S.W.3d 542, 550 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
30. Id. at 549–50.
31. See id. at 546–47.
32. See Wren, supra note 7, at 214–18 (discussing the two major rationales for
applying the economic loss rule).
33. See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex.
2007).
34. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872–73
(1986).
35. See id. at 874.
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economic loss rule ‘prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort
from dissolving one into the other.’”36
B. Protection of Tortfeasors from Unlimited Liability
to an Indeterminate Class
In situations where contractual privity is not present, a growing mi-
nority of jurisdictions have applied the economic loss rule due to the
potential for boundless liability and “disproportionality” between lia-
bility and fault that can otherwise occur.37 For example, the First Cir-
cuit adopted this approach, justifying its application of the economic
loss rule by explaining that unlike traditional damages for physical
harm, which are limited in scope and in the class of individuals
harmed, damages for pure economic damages are often far less fore-
seeable as to the class of individuals and the extent of damages.38 Ju-
risdictions that have adopted this rationale consider the risk
significant that a tortfeasor could be held liable by an unlimited
amount of plaintiffs that he or she is not in contractual privity with as
it “threatens to raise significantly the cost of even relatively simple
tort actions.”39
III. HAS TEXAS ADOPTED SECTION 552?
Texas courts have followed section 552 when applying the economic
loss rule in negligent misrepresentation suits.40 Texas courts have
adopted the “intermediate scope” standard set forth in section 552,
rather than the “near-privity” or “foreseeability” standards that have
been adopted in other jurisdictions.41 The “intermediate scope” stan-
dard or “Restatement” standard is broader than the “near-privity”
standard because it does not require the provider of negligent infor-
mation to know the precise identity of the third-party who will rely on
the information.42 The “intermediate scope” standard, on the other
hand, is narrower than the “foreseeability” standard, because it is re-
36. Wren, supra note 7, at 217 (quoting R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a
Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Mis-
representation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1796 (2000)).
37. Id. at 218; Schneier, supra note 12, § 9.
38. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.
1985).
39. Id.
40. Fowler, supra note 10, at 904.
41. Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas: The
Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 845, 852 (2008).
42. Id. at 849 (identifying the near-privity standard as a “relationship sufficiently
intimate to be equated with privity” (quoting Credit All. v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
483 N.E.2d 110, 112 (N.Y. 1985))). The near-privity standard requires three elements:
(1) that the information provider must have known that the misinformation would be
used in a specific transaction or for a specific purpose; (2) that the information pro-
vider must have known that the misinformation would be relied on by a third party;
and (3) some conduct by the information provider linking it to the third party that
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stricted to a limited class of persons rather than all third parties whose
reliance is reasonably foreseeable.43 Under the “intermediate scope”
or “Restatement” standard, protection extends to the limited class of
persons that the provider of information actually intends to receive
and be guided by the information, or should know will receive and be
guided by it, regardless of whether the provider of information knows
their specific identity.44
A. Texas Cases that Follow the Restatement
Texas courts have adopted section 552 in several instances. The first
Texas court to apply section 552 was the Fort Worth Court of Civil
Appeals in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James.45 Following Shatter-
proof Glass, the Texas Supreme Court adopted section 552 on two
additional occasions: first in Federal Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane46 and
then again in McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling
Interests.47 In McCamish, the issue was whether a nonclient could sue
an attorney for negligent misrepresentation.48 The Texas Supreme
Court strictly followed section 552, holding that the attorney would be
liable for the nonclient’s pecuniary losses because “the attorney who
provid[ed] the information [was] aware of the nonclient and in-
tend[ed] that the nonclient rely on the information.”49 The Court in
McCamish also noted that Texas courts have applied section 552 to a
variety of other professionals, and, therefore, could not “perceive
[any] reason why section 552 should not [also] apply to attorneys.”50
The Court also considered whether section 552 applied uniformly
across professional lines, or if it was limited to attorneys.51 The Court
evinces the provider’s understanding that the third party would rely on the misinfor-
mation. Wise & Poole, supra note 41, at 849–50.
43. Wise & Poole, supra note 41, at 850–51 (“The courts of three jurisdictions,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have adopted the foreseeability standard for
negligent misrepresentation.”).
44. Id. at 852, 860 (noting that the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 panel decision, declined to
certify the question “whether Texas uses actual knowledge requirement or foresee-
ability test for negligent misrepresentation” because the “Texas Supreme Court has
adopted the Restatement” (citing Compass Bank v. King, Griffen & Adamson, PC,
388 F.3d 504, 505 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2004)).
45. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 875–80 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Fort Worth 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552 tentative draft that contains the same language as the current version).
46. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991) (“We agree
with the Restatement’s definition [of negligent misrepresentation].”).
47. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d
787, 791 (Tex. 1999).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 794; see also Wise & Poole supra note 41, at 858. The court in McCamish
held that absent privity an attorney could be held liable to a third-party for negligent
misrepresentation under the Restatement Second of Torts section 552. McCamish,
991 S.W.2d at 791.
50. McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 791.
51. Wise & Poole, supra note 41, at 859 (citing McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 791).
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did not distinguish between the types of professionals that could be
liable for negligent misrepresentation but held that it applies evenly to
all categories of professionals.52
In 2011, the Houston Court of Appeals in CCE, Inc. v. PBS & J
Construction Services Inc. (“CCE, Inc.”),53 strictly followed sections
552 and 552B, outlining the requirements for damages in a negligent
misrepresentation suit.54 In CCE, Inc., a general contractor on a road
construction project sued a design professional for negligently repre-
senting the design plans.55 As in most design-for-build construction
contracts, the design professional and contractor were in contractual
privity with the project owner, but not with each other.56 The design
professional submitted design plans to the owner of the project and
the general contractor relied on these plans when bidding on and com-
pleting the project.57 The flaws in the design plans caused the contrac-
tor to suffer immense out-of-pocket damages.58 The First District
Court of Appeals held in favor of the general contractor because the
contractor’s claim for “damages [was] actually for its ‘pecuniary loss
suffered otherwise as a consequence of [the contractor’s] reliance
upon the misrepresentation[s]’” since the court quoted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts when it said, “pecuniary loss suffered other-
wise as a consequence of [the contractor’s] reliance upon the
misrepresentation[s]” of design professional’s design plans.59 Specifi-
cally, the contractor provided evidence that it paid over $2 million in
out-of-pocket expenses to complete the construction project—ex-
penses that were additional to what it would have cost the contractor
to complete the project absent the design professional’s negligent mis-
representation of the design plans.60
B. Texas Cases that Do Not Follow the Restatement
Although some Texas courts have followed section 552 allowing
damages for pecuniary loss for a negligent misrepresentation claim,
other Texas courts have also invoked the economic loss rule as a bar
to negligent misrepresentation claims.
In the 2010 case Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income
Fund, bond and hedge fund investors brought suit against an auditing
firm based upon its audit of Epic, a company that sold bonds to inves-
52. See id.
53. CCE, Inc. v. PBS & J Constr. Servs., Inc., 461 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
54. See id. at 544.
55. Id. at 545.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 545–46.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 551 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B(1)(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 1977)).
60. Id.
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tors.61 Epic employed Grant Thornton to audit and review its financial
statements for the years 1999 and 2000.62 Although Epic had not com-
plied with escrow account requirements, Grant Thornton issued re-
ports in 2000 and 2001 that confirmed Epic’s continued compliance—
a negligent misrepresentation.63 The hedge fund investors sued Grant
Thornton alleging that “the auditor’s reports misrepresented the es-
crow account status.”64 The Texas Supreme Court discussed the audi-
tor’s liability to third parties under section 552 and held that a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation is only available when the in-
formation is provided to a “known party for a known purpose.”65 Spe-
cifically, the Court, quoting the Restatement, described a “known
party” as limited persons “for whose benefit and guidance [one] in-
tends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it.”66 The hedge fund investors argued that they were within
the limited class of investors in the market who actually purchased the
bonds at issue.67 The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that the
investors were not part of the limited class described in section 552
because the bonds were sold on the open market and the investors
had no previous connection to Epic or Grant Thornton.68 Considering
the lack of connection to Grant Thornton, the Court explained that to
allow the investor’s negligent misrepresentation claim to prevail
would “eviscerate the Restatement rule in favor of a de facto foresee-
ability approach—an approach [the Court has] refused to embrace.”69
The Court applied the economic loss rule because the relationship be-
tween the auditors and the investors did not meet the “intermediate
scope” or “Restatement” standard for liability.
In the 1998 case D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Independent School Dis-
trict (“D.S.A.”), the Texas Supreme Court denied recovery for pecuni-
ary damages and invoked the economic loss rule.70 In D.S.A., a
construction firm contracted with Hillsboro Independent School Dis-
trict to supervise the building of a new school.71 The school district
61. Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 915–16
(Tex. 2010).
62. Id. at 916.
63. See id. at 916–17.
64. Id. at 917.
65. Id. at 920–21 (holding that the Restatement standard of “foreseeability” was
not met because the investment bankers were not within the limited class that the
auditor knew, or should have known, would rely on the information).
66. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (alteration in original)).
67. Id. at 921.
68. Id.
69. Id. (discussing that Texas has refused to adopt a mere foreseeability standard
and has instead adopted the “Restatement view” or “intermediate-scope standard”
when determining liability to third parties); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
70. See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998).
71. Id.
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subsequently sued the construction firm for negligent misrepresenta-
tion of the functions it would perform under the contract, but the
Court barred the claim because the school district failed to demon-
strate any injury independent of contract damages.72 The Court ap-
plied the economic loss rule as a bar to recovery because the school
district did not attempt to distinguish its out-of-pocket damages from
the contractual damages it was eligible to receive.73 The Court held
that allowing the school district to recover for the benefit of its bar-
gain through tort “would potentially convert every contract interpre-
tation dispute into a negligent misrepresentation claim.”74 Notably,
the Court did not hold that tort damages could never be recovered,
but only that the damages could not be recovered in this case because
the damages were recoverable by contract.75
IV. LAN/STV V. MARTIN K. EBY CONSTR. CO.: CASE SUMMARY
The question presented in this case was whether the economic loss
rule allowed a general contractor to recover pecuniary damages in-
curred from a design professional’s negligent misrepresentation of the
project’s plans and specifications.76
A. Facts
The Dallas Area Rapid Transportation Authority (“DART”) con-
tracted with LAN/STV, a design professional (architect), to prepare
construction plans and specifications for a light-rail transit line.77
DART received and incorporated the plans from LAN/STV into its
solicitation of general contractors to construct the light-rail transit
line.78 Martin K. Eby Construction Company (“Eby”) relied on the
design specifications when making its bid and was awarded the con-
tract.79 Eby had previous experience constructing light-rail transit
lines, specifically the company had built two other DART light-rail
projects, one of which was designed by LAN/STV.80
As is typical in construction contracts, DART contracted separately
with LAN/STV and Eby—LAN/STV and Eby did not enter into a
contract with each other.81 Upon beginning construction, Eby discov-
ered that the plans designed by LAN/STV were ridden with errors,
72. Id. at 663–64.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 664.
75. See id.
76. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. 2014).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Transcript of Oral Argument, LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435
S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2014) (No. 11-0810) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument] (rely-
ing on the design plans to be as accurate as they had been in previous projects).
81. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 236.
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resulting in adjustments or changes needed throughout 80% of the
plan.82 The errors disrupted the construction process, requiring new
materials and labor that Eby did not anticipate based on the design
plans it relied upon when submitting its bid.83 Overall, Eby calculated
that it lost $14 million on the project as a result of its reliance on
LAN/STV’s design plans.84
Eby filed a suit against LAN/STV on the grounds of negligence and
negligent misrepresentation.85 The only claim that went to the jury for
deliberation was that LAN/STV negligently misrepresented the work
to be done through its flawed design plans.86 The trial court rendered
judgment for Eby in the amount of $2.25 million, plus interest.87 Both
parties appealed the trial court’s judgment, and the Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed.88 Both LAN/STV and Eby petitioned and were
granted review by the Supreme Court of Texas.89 The Court reviewed
only LAN/STV’s argument that the economic loss rule barred Eby’s
recovery of economic losses for the alleged negligent
misrepresentation.90
B. Analysis
The Court first looked at the history and development of the eco-
nomic loss rule in the United States and its current status in Texas to
determine whether it could apply as a limitation on Eby’s ability to
recover pure economic losses.91
The Court examined the 1927 case Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint,92 as an early example of a court limiting recovery of pure
economic damages for a negligence claim.93 In Robins, charterers
were delayed using a steamship because of the dry dock’s negligence,
which failed to make timely repairs to the vessel.94 The charterers
sued the dry dock for economic damages that they incurred because of
the delay.95 The Robins Court held that the charterers could not re-
82. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80. Generally, contrac-
tors expect about 10% of the designs will need adjustment; in this case 80% of the
designs needed adjustment. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 236.
83. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 236.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 237. Because LAN/STV and Eby were not in contractual privity, Eby’s
only recourse was through tort, not contract. See id. at 249–50.
86. Id. at 237.
87. Id. (finding that Eby, DART, and LAN/STV all contributed to the overall $5
million in damages and apportioning 45% of the responsibility to LAN/STV, 40% to
DART, and 15% to Eby).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 237–38.
92. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
93. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 238.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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cover damages resulting from the dry dock’s negligence because the
dry dock and the charterers had no contract with each other—only the
owner of the vessel and the dry dock had a contract.96 The case em-
phasized that the owner’s contract with the dry dock created no duty
upon the dry dock to third-party charterers; whether the work was
performed negligently was only the “business of the owners and of
nobody else.”97
The Court then looked to Judge Higginbotham’s explanation of the
economic loss rule and its purpose in State of Louisiana v. M/V
Testbank,98 nearly sixty years after the Robins decision.99 Judge Hig-
ginbotham cites Professor Fleming James’ 1972 article, Limitations on
Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Ap-
praisal, which explains that judges have been reluctant to allow recov-
ery for pure economic losses because of the uncertainty concerned
with what a jury may or may not find to be foreseeable.100 Judge Hig-
ginbotham further notes that unlike negligence, which results in physi-
cal damages that are limited by the scope of the injury, indirect
economic losses can be unlimited, far-reaching, and “virtually open-
ended.”101 According to Judge Higginbotham, the remedy of risk allo-
cation through contract and insurance is more favorable to judges who
are reluctant to allow recovery for pure economic losses because con-
tract damages are foreseeable as to class and scope.102
The Court then examined Vincent R. Johnson’s view on the desira-
bility of the economic loss rule as a remedy in comparison to contract
and insurance.103 Vincent R. Johnson notes that the economic loss
rule acts as an important “boundary-line . . . separating the law of
torts from the law of contracts . . . in circumstances where both theo-
ries could apply.”104 According to Justice Blackmun, a victim who suf-
fers from pure economic losses should find his or her remedy “entirely
[in the] law of contracts” because in contract law “both parties may
set the terms of their own agreements.”105
96. Id. (citing the holding in Robins that absent privity of contract, there can be no
suit for negligence to a third party).
97. Id. (quoting Robins, 275 U.S. at 308–09).
98. Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
99. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 238 (citing Fleming James Jr., Limitations on Liabil-
ity for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 43, 43 (1972)).
100. Id. at 239 (quoting James, supra note 99, at 44).
101. Id. (citing James, supra note 99, at 45).
102. Id. at 239.
103. See id. at 239–40 (examining Judge Posner’s view on the economic loss rule’s
application to negligence claims).
104. Id. at 240 (quoting Johnson, supra note 3, at 546).
105. Id. at 239 (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 859 (1986)).
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The Court then discussed two current rationales for limiting recov-
ery through the economic loss rule.106 The first rationale discussed is
the indeterminate and disproportionate liability that is associated with
pure economic losses.107 The Court explained that a single negligent
act has the ability to cause economic loss to anyone who relies on it,
potentially resulting in the liability for damages that extend far be-
yond the negligent person’s blameworthiness.108 The second rationale
discussed is deference to contract.109 The Court explained that eco-
nomic injuries often occur when individuals choose to rely on an-
other’s manifestations when entering into an economic transaction.110
The Court explained that in economic transactions parties have the
full opportunity to explore risks associated with the transaction, and
either bargain for the allocation of that risk or obtain insurance.111
The Court explained that allocating risks and responsibilities for po-
tential economic harms through contract best serves the interests of
all parties involved, providing a more accurate distribution of respon-
sibility than a court could post-injury.112
The Court acknowledged that there is not a bright-line test in the
application of the economic loss rule, but provided the Restatement of
Torts rule that states “while there is no ‘general duty to avoid the un-
intentional infliction of economic loss,’ the duty may exist when the
rationales for limiting recovery are weak or absent.”113 It also ad-
dressed that the economic loss rule as applied to actions between con-
tractual strangers is unsettled.114
The Court cited to several Texas cases that have held a party can
recover economic losses resulting from reliance on a professional’s
misrepresentations.115 Specifically, the Court acknowledged several
professional malpractice exceptions to the application of the economic
loss rule, including professionals such as lenders, attorneys, and ac-
106. Id. at 240.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 240–41.
111. Id. at 241.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 241–42 (citing William Powers, Jr. & Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach
of Contract, and the “Economic Loss” Rule, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 477, 477 (1992));
see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 536 (“The confusing mass of precedent relating to
tort liability for economic loss has yet to be disentangled and expressed with the clar-
ity commonly found with respect to other tort law topics.”)).
114. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 243; see also Powers & Niver, supra note 113, at 482
(“Although cases between contractual strangers are the paradigm of the traditional
‘economic loss’ rule, no Texas case involving ‘strangers’ expressly addresses the eco-
nomic loss rule.”).
115. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 244–45 (discussing professional malpractice as an
exception to the general rule of applying the economic loss rule in actions for negli-
gent performance of services).
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countants.116 In summary, the Court references and agrees with the
Restatement view of liability for negligent misrepresentation:
[A] plaintiff’s reliance alone, even if foreseeable, is not a sufficient
basis for recovery; . . . a defendant generally must act with the ap-
parent purpose of providing a basis for the reliance. It may be useful
to say that a defendant . . . must “invite reliance” by the plaintiff, so
long as the expression is understood to refer to the defendant’s ap-
parent purpose and not to a temptation incidentally created by the
defendant’s words or acts.117
Eby argued that the economic loss rule should not bar its damages
in this case because LAN/STV negligently misrepresented the design
plans that it relied on.118 Eby cited to Sloane, McCamish, and Grant
Thornton, all negligent misrepresentation cases where the economic
loss rule did not bar recovery for pure economic losses.119 LAN/STV
countered Eby’s argument by emphasizing that the vertical nature of
construction projects creates a necessity of predictability of risk-allo-
cation through contract.120 LAN/STV argued that if one participant to
a construction project were able to recover against another that he or
she is not in contractual privity with, “the risk of liability to everyone
on the project would be magnified and indeterminate.”121
Initially, the Court generally agreed with LAN/STV’s argument that
the vertical nature of construction contracts requires predictability
through contract, explaining that the “web of contracts [involved in
construction projects] would be disrupted by tort suits between sub-
contractors or suits brought against them by a project’s owner.”122
The Court then considered whether design professionals should be
treated differently because of their status as professionals, allowing
contractors who are not in contractual privity with the architect to
recover economic losses based on negligent misrepresentation. The
Court agreed that
[t]he plans drawn by the architect are intended to serve as a basis
for reliance by the contractor who forms a bid on the basis of them
and is then hired to carry them out. The architect’s plans are analo-
gous to the audit report that an accountant supplies to a client for
116. Id. at 243–45.
117. Id. at 245 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5, cmt.a).
118. Id. at 246 (arguing that construction contractors are professionals that should
not be treated differently than lenders, accountants, and attorneys).
119. Id.
120. Id. (explaining that construction contracts between the participants are verti-
cal; each participant contracts with the owner but not each other).
121. Id. (referencing Justice Holmes’ discussion of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927)).
122. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 2014)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6, cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014) (“Allowing a suit against the architect of a
project by a party who made a bid on reliance on a defective plan does not create
comparable problems.”).
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distribution to potential investors—a standard case of liability [for
negligent misrepresentation].123
The Court held, however, that the contractor’s principal reliance
should be on the owner because the owner is the one presenting the
architect’s plans and the one who he or she will be in a contractual
agreement with, not the architect.124 The Court explained further that
even though the contractor relies on the architect’s design plans, the
architect’s plans are not directed to specific contractors, and are “no
more [than] an invitation to all potential bidders to rely.”125
The Court considered the effect that requiring the assignment of
risk through contract could have on unsophisticated contracting par-
ties.126 The Second Restatement of Torts encourages the assignment
of risk through contract but recognizes that it has the potential to neg-
atively affect unsophisticated contracting parties, leaving them with-
out remedy against another’s wrong.127 Although sophisticated parties
would recognize the necessity of risk-allocation and specifying rights
through contract in advance, less sophisticated parties may not recog-
nize this necessity and could “fail to provide for indemnification . . .
and inadvertently leave a party who has been wronged with no rem-
edy.”128 The Court responded to the concern regarding parties with
varying levels of sophistication, concluding that it is more likely than
not that a contractor will “assume it must look to its agreement with
the owner for damages” against potential misrepresentation.129
In conclusion, the Court held that the economic loss rule precludes
contractors from recovering economic losses from a design profes-
sional in tort.130
V. TEXAS SHOULD ADOPT SECTION 552
It is common for construction projects to have the design and con-
struction of the project bifurcated between a design professional and a
contractor.131 Because there is no privity between the contractor and
design professional on the project, any claim by the contractor against
123. Id. at 246–47 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6, cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014) (alteration in original)).
124. Id. at 247.
125. Id. (comparing the audit report in Grant Thornton and the architect’s plans,
concluding that the architect’s plans were no more than an invitation for all potential
bidders to rely rather than directed at specific contractors).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 247–48 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, reporter’s note to
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012)).
128. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, reporter’s note to cmt. f.
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012)).
129. Id. at 248 (discussing that “clarity allows parties to do business on a surer foot-
ing”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2014).
130. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 249–50.
131. Schneier, supra note 12, § 2.
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the design professional must sound in tort. When a design professional
provides defective design documents that cause a contractor to incur
more expenses than anticipated, the contractor will naturally look to
recoup some of those costs, and rightfully so. The design professional,
not wanting to be financially responsible for his or her mistake, most
often will seek to have the contractor’s claim dismissed based on ei-
ther the privity doctrine or the economic loss rule.132 Courts in the
majority of jurisdictions have held that lack of privity is not a bar to a
negligence claim.133 Courts are divided on the second issue—whether
the contactor’s claim for pure economic losses should be barred under
the economic loss rule.134 In LAN/STV, the Court held in the affirma-
tive with regard to both, creating a bright-line distinction that funda-
mentally altered the availability of pecuniary damages by a contractor
in a suit against a design professional for negligent
misrepresentation.135
The Court in LAN/STV did not adopt section 552 as applied to the
contractor’s (Eby) claim for negligent misrepresentation against a de-
sign professional (LAN/STV). Instead, the Court held (1) that the
plans were no more than a mere invitation for all potential bidders to
rely; and (2) that Eby’s reliance should have been on the project
owner DART, with whom Eby was in contractual privity with, rather
than the third-party design professional LAN/STV with whom he had
no contract.136
Section 552 sets the parameters of negligent misrepresentation and
the duty owed when one supplies information to others for one’s own
pecuniary gain, intending or knowing that others will rely on the infor-
mation in the course of their business activities.137 Negligent misrepre-
sentation is narrowly tailored, as it applies only to those who provide
information or services with the intent or knowledge that it will be
relied upon by third parties; and contains a foreseeability requirement
that limits the class of potential plaintiffs.138 Modern businessmen and
businesswomen rely heavily on experts and professionals for informa-
tion and guidance. Although these individuals may have no contrac-
tual relationship with the expert or professional who supplies the
information—and, therefore, no remedy in contract—the supplier is
well aware that the information provided will be used and relied on.
Section 552 reflects the modern realities of business, recognizing that
132. See id.
133. Id. (citing United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal.
1958)).
134. Id.
135. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 249–50.
136. Id. at 246–47. The LAN/STV Court applied the privity doctrine as to bar the
contractor’s negligent misrepresentation claims. Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
138. Bilt-Right Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286 (Pa.
2005).
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information providers have a traditional duty of care, regardless of
privity, for the information they supply.
A. The Privity Doctrine
In LAN/STV, the Court held that the architect owed no duty of care
to the contractor because the two parties were not in privity of con-
tract and Eby was not within the limited class of persons LAN/STV
intended to rely on the design documents, as the designs were no
more than an invitation for all potential contractors to rely.139 The
Court in LAN/STV was concerned that allowing a third party contrac-
tor to maintain a negligent misrepresentation claim against a design
professional he or she is not in privity with would subject the design
professional to unlimited liability to an indeterminate class.140 The
majority of American jurisdictions have eliminated the defense that
an architect owes no duty of care to a contractor because of lack of
privity of contract.141 The jurisdictions that prohibit lack of privity as a
defense to a tort claim have adopted section 552, which imposes a
duty of care in tort regardless of the party’s privity so long as the in-
formation is supplied to a “limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance [the architect] intends to supply the information.”142
Texas has adopted the “intermediate scope standard” when applying
section 552, meaning the provider of information does not need to
know the precise identity of the third party who will rely on the infor-
mation, but this standard entails something more than mere foresee-
ability of reliance.143 Further, Texas precedent has allowed recovery
for negligent misrepresentation, regardless of privity.144 For example,
in Sharyland Water Supply Corp., the Texas Supreme Court stated
that recovery of pure economic losses for parties not in contractual
privity is recoverable in certain torts, including the tort of negligent
misrepresentation.145 The LAN/STV Court held that Eby could not
base a claim in tort for the negligent misrepresentations made by
LAN/STV, ignoring the recent precedent that allows third parties to
139. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 247–48.
140. Id. at 240.
141. Schneier, supra note 12, § 9 (citing an early seminal case, United States v. Rog-
ers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1959), which rejected the privity defense).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see supra
notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
143. Wise & Poole, supra note 41, at 852; see supra notes 40–44 and accompanying
text.
144. See Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 279–80 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(collecting Texas cases that apply the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) to negligent misrepresentations not made directly to the injured
party).
145. Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 418 (Tex.
2011).
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recover damages for negligent misrepresentation, regardless of
privity.146
In a seminal case from the Southern District of California adopting
section 552, a contractor sued an architect for negligent misrepresen-
tation.147 The district court found “[a]ltogether too much control over
the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the supervising archi-
tect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by law to perform
without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor.”148 Sim-
ilarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted section 552 and
ruled that a contractor may sue the project architect for negligent mis-
representation to recover economic losses, notwithstanding the lack of
privity between the parties.149 The court found that section 552 is nar-
rowly focused on misrepresentations made in the context of business
transactions where individuals must rely on the guidance of experts,
and held that imposing liability under section 552 does nothing more
than hold the supplier to a traditional duty of care.150 Further, the
court provided that architects who are hired to create designs for an
owner know that the designs will be relied upon by contractors in pric-
ing their bids; thus, the adoption of section 552 does not subject sup-
pliers of information to unlimited liability to an indeterminate class.151
B. The Economic Loss Rule—Adoption and Exceptions Generally
Jurisdictions across the country, including Texas, are divided on
whether the economic loss rule bars lawsuits brought by contractors
against design professionals. According to LAN/STV, jurisdictions are
divided 9–8 on the issue.152 A significant number of states adopt the
economic loss rule while many others reject it. In many jurisdictions,
to defeat the application of the economic loss rule, contractors need to
bring their claim into one of the several exceptions to the rule. The
most significant exception to the economic loss rule is the Restate-
ment of Torts “business guidance” or negligent misrepresentation ex-
ception; other exceptions include professional malpractice and special
relationship.153
146. Steiner, 734 F. Supp. at 279–80.
147. See United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
148. Id. at 136.
149. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa.
2005).
150. Id. at 286.
151. See id. at 285–86.
152. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 249 n.60 (Tex. 2014)
(discussing nine cases that apply the economic loss rule and eight cases that do not).
153. Schneier, supra note 12, § 2.
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C. The Restatement Second of Torts Business Guidance Exception
to the Economic Loss Rule
Several American jurisdictions that have recognized a version of the
economic loss rule have also adopted a “business guidance” exception
to its imposition.154 The “business guidance” exception allows a con-
tractor to sue an architect or engineer under section 552.155 Section
552 provides that a person, who in the course of his profession sup-
plies faulty information for the guidance of others in a business trans-
action, is subject to liability for pecuniary losses caused to the person
he or she provided the information to because of the person’s justifia-
ble reliance upon the information.156 Illustration 9, comment h to sec-
tion 552 provides an example of the “business guidance” exception,
describing a situation where a third-party design professional negli-
gently misrepresents information to a contractor who then relies upon
that information to his or her detriment.157 The illustration begins
with a city that asks for bids for a construction project involving a
sewer tunnel.158 The city first hires a firm of engineers to make boring
tests and provide a report showing the soil and rock conditions.159 The
engineering company prepares an inaccurate report that contains
faulty and misleading information.160 Based on the inaccurate infor-
mation in the report, the contractor submits its bid and suffers pecuni-
ary losses when the project costs more than expected.161 Even though
the two are not in privity of contract, the illustration concludes that
the engineering company owed a duty of care and is subject to liability
to the contractor for its pecuniary losses.162
1. LAN/STV Provided Design Plans to Guide Eby
In LAN/STV, the design professional LAN/STV provided design
plans—80% of which were inaccurate—to DART.163 DART then pro-
vided the inaccurate design plans to a limited class of contractors,
qualified to work on light-rail transit lines, for their reliance when sub-
mitting their bids for the construction project.164 Because the design
plans were submitted by a design professional in the course of his em-
ployment for the purpose of being used by a contractor on the con-
154. See id. § 11 (discussing jurisdictions that have adopted the “business guidance
exception” to the application of the economic loss rule).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 552, cmt. h, illus. 9.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. 2014) (ex-
plaining that design plans on a typical project have 10% error).
164. Id. at 246; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80.
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struction project, it follows that the plans were submitted for the
guidance of a contractor.165
2. Eby (the Contractor) Justifiably Relied on the Design Plans
Provided by LAN/STV
DART provided Eby with the design plans for the purpose of guid-
ing Eby, the contractor, in making its bid on the construction project,
and Eby justifiably relied on these design plans when submitting its
bid.166 In Grant Thornton, the Court considered the element of justifi-
able reliance in a negligent representation claim.167 In measuring the
justifiableness of reliance, the Court considered whether at the time of
the misrepresentation the plaintiff’s “individual characteristics, abili-
ties, and appreciation of [the] facts and circumstances [made it] ex-
tremely unlikely that there [was] actual reliance on the plaintiff’s
part.”168 The Court held that reliance is not acceptable “if there are
‘red flags’ indicating that such reliance is unwarranted.”169 In oral ar-
guments prior to the judgment in LAN/STV, Eby’s attorney argued
that his client, the contractor, justifiably relied on the design plans
provided by LAN/STV because Eby was not allowed to do any kind
of pre-bid site inspection prior to placing the bid for the project, and
therefore only had the integrity of the LAN/STV’s design plans to rely
on.170 Eby’s attorney further argued that Eby’s reliance was justifiable
because Eby and LAN/STV had a previous relationship in which they
worked together on a similar light-rail line project for DART.171
Based on this information, there is a substantial likelihood that Eby
exhibited actual and justifiable reliance on the design plans provided
by LAN/STV.
3. Eby Was Within the Limited Class
When considering the question of whether contractors are within
the limited class for whom design professionals intend to rely, it seems
significant that design professionals prepare design plans for a project
with the knowledge that contractors will be required to rely on the
plans. DART contracted with LAN/STV to prepare plans, drawings,
and specifications to be used by prospective contractors during the
construction bidding process, and later for the construction project it-
165. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 247. The LAN/STV Court did not disagree that
LAN/STV provided the design plans for the benefit of the contractor. See id. at
249–50.
166. See id. at 236–37.
167. See Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913 (Tex.
2010).
168. Id. at 923 (quoting Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
169. Id. at 923–24.
170. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80.
171. Id.
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self.172 Section 552 applies to all types of professionals because profes-
sionals, knowing that others will rely, have a duty imposed by the
common law to not provide false information to others in the course
of their business.173 However, this duty does not have universal appli-
cability in that it is not to the whole world; the provider of information
need not know the precise identity of the individuals who will rely on
the information, but rather the limited class of individuals who will
rely.174 In oral arguments prior to the judgment in LAN/STV, Eby’s
attorney argued that LAN/STV did know of the class of contractors
who were bidding on the project.175 Specifically, the attorney stated
that there were only five bidders and that the bidders were submitting
questions to which LAN/STV was actively responding.176 Based on
this information, LAN/STV was not providing the design plans for all
the contractors in the world, as the Court suggested, but rather for the
limited class of five contractors bidding on this specific construction
project.177
D. Professional Malpractice Exception to the Economic Loss Rule
Several jurisdictions that have adopted some version of the eco-
nomic loss rule have found a “professional malpractice” exception to
its imposition.178 Jurisdictions that apply the “professional malprac-
tice” exception acknowledge that professionals, such as accountants
and attorneys, are liable for pecuniary damages suffered by third per-
sons with whom they are not in contractual privity, and “refuse to
adopt a different rule for design professionals.”179 These courts ac-
knowledge that the common law standard of care requires profession-
als to exercise reasonable care in applying their skills, abilities,
judgment, and at a minimum, perform their duties consistent with the
way other professionals in the same field would perform under similar
circumstances.180 Specifically, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Lia-
bility for Economic Harm section 6, comment b states:
[T]he plans drawn by the architect are intended to serve as a basis
for reliance by the contractor who forms a bid on the basis of them
172. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 236.
173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80.
174. Id.; see also supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
175. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80 (emphasis added). The attorney
for Eby Construction Company explained that although section 552 does not require
the information provider to know the precise identity of the limited class who will rely
on the information—a higher burden, he had done so in this case. Id.
176. Id.
177. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 247.
178. See Schneier, supra note 12, § 15 (discussing jurisdictions that refuse to apply
the economic loss rule on the ground that doing so would eviscerate professional mal-
practice law).
179. Id.
180. John W. Hays, Construction Defect Claims Against Design Professionals and
Contractors, 23 CONSTRUCTION L. 9, at *1 (2003).
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and is then hired to carry them out. The architect’s plans are analo-
gous to the audit report that an accountant supplies to a client for
distribution to potential investors—a standard case of liability for
negligent misrepresentation.181
The LAN/STV Court acknowledged a professional malpractice excep-
tion to the economic loss rule in regard to claims against attorneys,
accountants, auditors, and lenders.182 The Supreme Court of Texas, in
Grant Thornton, held that an accountant, who provides an audit re-
port for the guidance of investors, could be sued for negligent misrep-
resentation by the limited class that the report was provided by virtue
of the accountant’s status as a professional.183 Similarly, in McCamish,
the Supreme Court of Texas held that a lawyer, as a professional, is
liable for negligent misrepresentation to a nonclient in narrow
circumstances.184
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v.
Architectural Studio, applied the “professional malpractice” exception
to the application of the economic loss rule in the construction con-
text.185 The Court held that “an architect, in the performance of his
contract with his employer, is required to exercise the ability, skill,
and care customarily used by architects upon such projects,”186 and
further explained that professional malpractice has long been recover-
able in tort.187 Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that a design professional owes no duty to anyone absent a
contract.188 The court recognized that the prevailing rule throughout
the majority of jurisdictions is that professionals rendering services are
liable in situations in which they are negligent in providing those ser-
vices.189 The court explained the reasoning behind the professional li-
ability rule:
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others [i.e., other pro-
fessionals] deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually
called upon to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate
and provide for random factors which are incapable of precise mea-
surement. The indeterminate nature of these factors makes it im-
possible for professional service people to gauge them with
complete accuracy in every instance. Thus, doctors cannot promise
that every operation will be successful; a lawyer can never be cer-
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
182. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 244–45.
183. Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 915–17
(Tex. 2010).
184. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d
787, 794–95 (Tex. 1999).
185. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2005).
186. Id. at 286–87.
187. Id. at 288.
188. Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., Inc., 386
N.W.2d 375, 376–77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
189. Id.
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tain that a contract he drafts is without latent ambiguity; and an
architect cannot be certain that a structural design will interact with
natural forces as anticipated. Because of the inescapable possibility
of error[,] which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally
required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and
judgment which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated
professionals.190
LAN/STV’s negligence was not debated in the LAN/STV case, and
the Court clearly stated that “professional malpractice” is an excep-
tion to the application of the economic loss rule.191 Further, LAN/
STV did not exercise the skill and judgment that can reasonably be
expected from similarly situated design professionals.192 LAN/STV
provided design plans that were 80% inaccurate, whereas the industry
standard for inaccuracies in design plans is 10%.193 Accordingly, the
LAN/STV Court should have expanded the “professional malprac-
tice” exception to design professionals and held that design profes-
sionals are liable for negligent misrepresentation in Texas, the same
way accountants and attorneys are. There is no reason why design
professionals should be treated differently from other professionals
with respect to negligent misrepresentation liability.194
E. Special Relationship Exception to the Economic Loss Rule
Several jurisdictions refuse to apply the economic loss rule because
a “special relationship” exists between contractors and design profes-
sionals. Jurisdictions that apply the “special relationship” exception
allow a contractor who suffers economic losses, which result from
their justifiable reliance on inaccurate design plans, to bring a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim against the design professional, regard-
less of privity.195 For example, the Florida District Court of Appeals
relied upon section 552 and held that a design professional who
190. Id. (citing City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Minn.
1978)).
191. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 243–44 (Tex. 2014).
192. See id. at 236.
193. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80. Generally, contractors expect
about 10% of their designs will need adjustment; in this case 80% of the designs
needed adjustment. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 236.
194. The Bachelor of Architecture normally requires at least five years to complete.
The Master of Architecture requires from one to five years to complete depending on
the individual student’s previous education. When the master’s degree follows a four-
year, pre-professional architecture degree, it represents the “two” in the term “four-
plus-two” program, and is the final portion of the professional phase of the study
program. The Doctor of Architecture requires three years to complete after a pre-
professional degree, the “three” in the terms “four plus three” and is the final portion
of the professional phase of the study program. Architecture Programs, ASS’N COL-
LEGIATE SCH. ARCHITECTURE, http://www.acsa-arch.org/resources/student-resources/
overview/architecture-programs [http://perma.cc/4VWV-D3BA].
195. Schneier, supra note 12, § 17 (discussing courts that refuse to apply the eco-
nomic loss rule due to a special relationship between the architect and contractor).
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prepares erroneous design documents with knowledge that the owner
will supply them to a contractor is a sufficient basis to establish a spe-
cial relationship.196 The Florida court then applied section 552 and
held that the economic loss rule does not bar an action for pure eco-
nomic losses when a special relationship exists between the profes-
sional and the third-party.197 Similarly, in Eastern Steel Constructors,
Inc. v. City of Salem, a contractor sued a design professional for eco-
nomic losses caused by the design professional’s design flaws.198 The
Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Eastern Steel Constructors, Inc.,
held that a contractor may sue the design professional for negligent
misrepresentation to recover economic losses because a “special rela-
tionship” exists between the parties.199 The Court further explained
that because a “special relationship” exists between a design profes-
sional and contractor, regardless of privity, the design professional
owes a duty of care to a contractor that has contracted with the same
project owner and who has relied upon the design professional’s plans
in carrying out his or her obligations to the owner.200 Therefore, the
LAN/STV Court could have applied the “special relationship” excep-
tion and held that regardless of privity between LAN/STV and Eby, a
“special relationship” between the two had been formed. This “special
relationship” imposed a duty of care upon LAN/STV to provide accu-
rate design plans to LAN/STV—a duty that LAN/STV breached.
VI. POLICY ISSUES SUPPORT THE ADOPTION OF THE
RESTATEMENT SECTION 552
There are several policy and practical considerations in favor of
adopting section 552 in Texas. First, limiting available damages to only
those contracted for has the potential to negatively impact the motiva-
tion for design professionals to provide accurate plans, because tort
liability, which provides strong incentives to not engage in negligent
activity that could result in monetary damages, has been eliminated.
Second, limiting the available damages to only those contracted for
has the potential of negatively impacting unsophisticated parties.
Third, limiting the available damages to only those contracted for will
196. Hewett-Kier Constr., Inc. v. Lemuel Ramos & Assocs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 373,
374–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
197. Id. at 375 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST.
1977)).
198. E. Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 268–69 (W. Va.
2001).
199. Id. at 277 (“[A] design professional . . . providing plans and specifications that
will be followed by the contractor in carrying out some aspect of a design, impliedly
warrants to the contractor, notwithstanding the absence of privity of contract between
the contractor and the design professional, that such plans and specifications have
been prepared with the ordinary skill, care and diligence commensurate with that
rendered by members of his or her profession.”).
200. Id.
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negatively impact public-works construction projects, as the contrac-
tor does not have the same opportunity to bargain with the owner as
do the parties engaged in private construction projects.
A. Disincentive to Provide Accurate Work
Tort liability is a powerful economic incentive for design profession-
als to not provide faulty or negligently misrepresented design plans to
contractors.201 However, the LAN/STV Court held that a design pro-
fessional who provides negligently misrepresented design documents
to a third-party contractor, on which he or she justifiably relies, should
not be exposed to tort liability because there is no contractual rela-
tionship between the parties.202 Eliminating the availability of dam-
ages in tort removes a powerful incentive for the design professional
to ensure that they are providing accurate design plans—as they will
rarely be in contractual privity with the contractor in these types of
construction projects.203 Although courts have been reluctant to im-
pose tort liability for pure economic losses, states have recognized the
negligent misrepresentation exception to the application of the eco-
nomic loss rule, particularly where policy concerns about administra-
tive costs and the disproportionate balance between liability and fault
weigh in favor of liability.204 Nevada has adopted this exception based
on its view that without such liability, the law would not exert signifi-
cant financial pressures to avoid such negligence.205 Similarly, the First
Circuit explained, “Awarding damages for financial harm caused by
negligent misrepresentation is special in that, without such liability,
tort law would not exert significant financial pressure to avoid negli-
gence; [for example] a negligent accountant lacks physically harmed
victims as potential plaintiffs.”206 The design professional intends and
expects that the contractor on the project will use the design plans and
rely on the design professional’s assurance of quality. Because the de-
sign professional is inviting the use, the design professional should not
be permitted to avoid responsibility when the expected use leads to
injury and loss by claiming that he or she made no contact directly
with the user. The design professional has committed a tort, and
therefore should be liable for economic losses that stem from that
tort. The economic incentive of tort liability for design professionals
to not negligently misrepresent design plans should not be eliminated
in the construction context where the stakes are often high and the
parties are professionals. Texas should instead adopt section 552,
201. DEVLIN, supra note 13, at 80–86.
202. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 249–50 (Tex. 2014).
203. DEVLIN, supra note 13, at 80–86.
204. Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 206 P.3d 81, 88 (Nev.
2009).
205. Id. at 88–89.
206. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir.
1985).
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which maintains tort liability and the economic incentive to provide
quality work.
B. Unsophisticated Parties Are Prejudiced
by the LAN/STV Decision
The influence of the LAN/STV decision on unsophisticated parties
is concerning. The Court in LAN/STV brushed past the effects that
the contract-only remedy could have on unsophisticated parties. Spe-
cifically, the Court held that it was more probable than not that a con-
tractor would assume that it must look to its agreement with the
owner for damages if the project is not as represented.207 Although
sophisticated parties understand that they are free to assign risk by
contract through negotiation, which the law does not allow in tort,
unsophisticated parties can be jeopardized by the assignment of risk
through the contract-only approach.208 The contract-only approach
disallows tort claims between parties indirectly linked by contract, as-
serting pressures on the parties to specify rights, obligations, and rem-
edies carefully in advance.209 Although sophisticated parties may
understand the necessity of specifying rights and remedies in advance
to protect their interests, unsophisticated parties are more likely to be
confused by the broad tort rule and fail to contract for the protection
they need, inadvertently resulting in a lack of remedy for an injured
party.210 Even sophisticated parties are confused by this rule—take
the LAN/STV case for example. Section 552 is concerned with the
well-being of unsophisticated parties who may not know or under-
stand the necessity of negotiating for rights and remedies through con-
tract in advance.211 Section 552 protects unsophisticated parties who
207. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 247–48 (emphasis added).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft,
No. 2, 2014). The Restatement posits the following situation in illustration 8 to section
3:
City hires Engineer to test soil conditions at a site where it plans to erect a
large building. City explains that Engineer’s report will be distributed to pro-
spective building contractors for use in estimating their costs. Engineer neg-
ligently submits an inaccurate report. Contractor wins the right to perform
the construction, having relied on Engineer’s report in preparing its bid. En-
gineer’s errors cause Contractor to suffer losses in performing its contract
with City. The contracts between Contractor and City, and between City and
Engineer, do not preclude a claim by Contractor against Engineer [for negli-
gent performance of services or negligent misrepresentation]. Engineer re-
mains potentially liable to Contractor under either of those [torts]. But the
Restatement adds: Contractor could have insisted that City guarantee the
soundness of Engineer’s report, and City could have insisted that Engineer
indemnify City for claims brought against it by Contractor. In effect, those
contracts would have protected Contractor against the risk of errors by En-
gineer, and would have ensured that Engineer would bear the costs of its
negligence.
209. Id. § 3 (citing reporter’s note to cmt. f).
210. Id.
211. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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may lack this foresight by providing an equitable remedy for claims of
negligent misrepresentation through tort.212 Why should Texas law
leave an injured party without remedy, when a remedy in tort is so
readily available? Some courts have even asked the question, why
should a party fortunate enough to not have suffered personal injuries
not have a remedy in tort—economic losses are important too!213
C. Public-Works Projects Have Little Opportunity for Bargaining
One principle underlying the decision in LAN/STV to apply the ec-
onomic loss rule is that the parties are in the best position to protect
their interests through bargaining and contractual negotia-
tion.214 However, the LAN/STV Court did not consider the effect the
holding would have in the realm of public contracting, where such op-
portunity for bargaining does not exist. Construction projects for pub-
lic works oftentimes must be awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder, and the contractual language, which is distributed with the in-
vitation for bid, is not subject to traditional negotiation as is present in
private contracts.215 In fact, contractors typically must all bid upon the
same fixed terms provided by the public entity.216 If the public entity
does not provide a provision in the contract protecting the contractor
from responsibility for defective plans and specifications, then the risk
and liability resulting from defective design documents rests upon the
contractor under Texas common law.217 Under the LAN/STV rule,
public contractors will continue to bear a disproportionate amount of
risk for defects over which they have no legitimate opportunity to con-
trol through contractual bargaining and negotiation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not radical or
revolutionary, it merely reflects the modern realities of business rela-
tionships—parties must rely on the specialized expertise of those with
whom they have no contractual relationship. The LAN/STV Court
had an opportunity to adopt section 552 and hold design professionals
responsible in tort for the negligent designs they provide, which sev-
eral American jurisdictions have already adopted. Following the
LAN/STV decision, Texas law is “settled” in regard to the applicabil-
212. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2012).
213. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc. 548 P.2d 279, 291 (Alaska 1976).
214. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 246 (Tex. 2014).
215. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 252.043 (West 2012).
216. Id.
217. Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 104 S.W. 1061, 1068 (Tex. 1907)
(establishing the common law rule for risk and liability resulting from design docu-
ments in public works contracts).
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ity of the economic loss rule in the construction context, but it is far
from equitable.
Texas should instead adopt the negligent misrepresentation excep-
tion, set forth in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to
the application of the economic loss rule in the construction context
because it provides balanced and equitable results. Design profession-
als are professionals who should be held to a standard common law
duty of care. Texas has already adopted the negligent misrepresenta-
tion exception to other categories of professionals, and there is no
clear reason why the exception should not also extend to design pro-
fessionals. Section 552 limits the class of individuals the design profes-
sional will be liable to, eliminating any fear of unlimited liability to an
indeterminate class, and most importantly holds the professional re-
sponsible when the work he or she provides is negligent. Future court
decisions will hopefully recognize the inequities of this rule in such a
way that the court will have no choice but to allow recovery of eco-
nomic damages in tort. But until then, contractors will have to rely on
their existing contract with the project owner to recover their eco-
nomic losses.
